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BEYOND WELFARE REFORM: CAN WE BUILD A 
LOCAL WELFARE STATE? 
Frank Munger* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the twenty-first century, privatization of the American 
welfare state continues. Provision of welfare for workers and 
poor is increasingly left to the discretion of employers or 
charities. Reliance on public or private welfare by those who 
cannot make ends meet has always been stigmatized as de-
pendency. Now, dependency is the point of attack on the poor 
and workers alike. Welfare for the poor has been severely re-
stricted, and the number of impoverished, mother-only fami-
lies aided by public benefits has been cut in half. Similarly, 
increasing restrictions are placed on private pensions, health 
insurance, workers compensation, unemployment compensa-
tion, and even bankruptcy relief from overburdening debt. 1 
The "dependent" poor and the low-wage labor force are in-
creasingly denied social citizenship, immigrants in their own 
society. 
Advocates for the poor have long attempted to influence 
national policy deliberations. They urge greater collective 
economic security, making the case for civil rights for both the 
poor and others excluded from a full life by circumstances be-
yond their control. Entitlements they have won for the poor 
mark the boundary of full social citizenship. But advocates 
for the poor are now losing most battles for welfare rights and 
* Professor of Law, New York Law School, J.D., Ph.D., University of 
Michigan. 
1. See, MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE 
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2001). See generally Jean Braucher, Consumer 
Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?, 44 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1065 (2004); Deborah Maranville, Unemployment Insur-
ance Meets Globalization and the Modern Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1129 (2004). 
999 
1000 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW Vol: 44 
economic redistribution at the national level. Today, propos-
als for expanding rights for the poor, disabled, minorities, 
women, and immigrants meet stiff resistance. As a result, 
new proposals are less broad and less numerous. Equal wel-
fare for all members of our society-national health care, 
adequate pensions, unemployment for all the unemployed, a 
minimum wage corresponding to the minimum cost of living, 
and a living wage for care work as well as market work-is 
disfavored. The notion of equal welfare indeed seems un-
thinkable in an era when the welfare state is under attack 
and nearly all forms of welfare are being rolled back or in-
dexed to wealth.2 
The cutting edge in welfare advocacy, many activists 
seem to argue, is not advocacy for rights and redistribution at 
the national level, but rather advocacy within communities. 
Activism from below continues to keep a long tradition of mu-
tual assistance, community economic development, and other 
experiments in economic democracy alive. Now the focus is 
on .opportunities to create progressive forms of welfare 
through local organizing and co-optation of private and public 
authority at the local level. 
Projects to build local welfare institutions have produced 
some notable successes. However, the small numbers of suc-
cessful projects and the limited scope of those projects raise 
important questions about whether local political alliances 
seeking redistributive public and private welfare can succeed 
as a wider strategy for building a more inclusive welfare 
state. As advocates and scholars seek a better definition of 
the local-state welfare project, they must define both its goals 
and preconditions, and they must identify means of achieving 
the improbable-inclusion of the poorest, least stably em-
ployed, lowest paid working poor. 
2. Poor, working class, and middle income persons (especially middle in-
come home owners), those with enough wealth to invest, and corporations all 
receive different packages of welfare benefits from the government in the form 
of income supplements, tax breaks, or other subsidies. The largest of these 
benefits, including the home mortgage tax exclusion and special tax breaks and 
subsidies for corporations, together with the skewed tax reductions of the past 
several years, insure that the distribution of welfare favors those with wealth 
even while expenditures for the very poor are reduced. See, e.g., KEVIN 
PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
RICH (2001); see also WILLIAM GALE ET AL., CENTER FOR BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, THE ULTIMATE BURDEN OF THE TAX CUTS (June 2, 2004), available 
at http://www.cbpp.org/6-2-04tax.htm. 
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In this brief comment, I focus on recipients of traditional 
welfare-poor single mothers-and their needs. I describe 
the failure of welfare reform, together with some of the les-
sons we have ignored but could learn from successful welfare 
experiments about how and why welfare should be provided. 
I conclude with a brief and preliminary analysis of some of 
the political and conceptual issues that advocates face in sus-
taining political alliances at the community level. I draw on a 
growing literature describing strategies for deepening democ-
racy in communities. Importantly, this analysis illustrates 
how emerging strategies for democratic experimentalism and 
deepened community democracy depend on national poverty 
advocacy that uses the rhetoric of the market and devolution 
to provide benchmarks, mandates, and local authority for 
administration of redistributive policies. 
II. WELFARE 
A. Welfare Reform: Watching as Caring 
Anglo-American relief for the poor reflects underlying 
moral judgments about dependency. Those who are unable to 
attain self-sufficiency through market labor, and not excused 
by disability or age are morally stigmatized as "undeserving" 
poor.3 Since Elizabethan times,4 welfare for the poor has been 
administered under conditions designed to drive all but the 
most desperate into the labor market-a corrective for their 
moral weakness and stern example to others. 
Once again, welfare reform has "cured" dependency by 
pressuring recipients to leave welfare for work-any work. 
Contemporary welfare reform politics has reinforced the iden-
tity of "undeserving" poor. Professor Sanford Schram argues 
that the current welfare reformers have succeeded in creating 
a "medicalized" identity for welfare recipients as individuals 
who suffer from the "disease" of dependency.5 The prescrip-
tion for this disease is tough administration of work and 
child-bearing requirements for those who seek welfare. 6 As 
3. See generally JOEL HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, WE THE POOR 
PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY & WELFARE (1997). 
4. See id. at 21. 
5. See SANDFORD SCHRAM, AFTER WELFARE: THE CULTURE OF 
POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIAL POLICY 59-71 (2000). 
6. See id. at 63-70. 
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Lawrence Mead has said, the discipline imposed by strict ad-
ministration of welfare is the reform. 7 After 1996, entitle-
ments are fewer, obligations are more numerous, and recipi-
ents are continuously supervised and micromanaged. 8 
Denying aid to all but the most severely disadvantaged seems 
to confirm the claim that welfare recipients are those who 
have become helplessly dependent. Conversely, the vast 
number who left welfare (many, if not most, for violating any 
of numerous bureaucratic rules) seems to confirm that most 
should not have received public benefits in the first place. 
In contemporary welfare politics, thinly veiled class in-
terests contend. From its inception, the American welfare 
state keyed social citizenship to individual qualifications, 
primarily work history and earnings-both determined by 
employers.9 Welfare reforms have arrayed pro-market, pro-
business advocates who favor a low-wage, flexible, and docile 
work force against advocates for the economically insecure, 
favoring pooled risk and greater economic opportunity that 
would permit individuals to enter the labor market on their 
own terms. The ideology of the market dominates, and both 
major political parties support flexible labor policies, reduced 
government welfare, and "marketized citizenship" linking 
adequate welfare benefits even more tightly to success in the 
labor market. Provision of welfare for workers and poor is in-
creasingly left to the discretion of employers or charities. 
While the scope and benefit levels of social citizenship have 
been continuously contested, 10 the structure of the American 
7. See id. at 71. 
8. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Dis-
cretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 1145-72 
(2000). 
9. See generally JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, 
LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC-PRlvATE WELFARE STATE 
(2003). 
10. See JOEL HANDLER & YEHESKEL HAsENFELD, THE MORAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 82-132 (1991). The 
poor who are deemed undeserving and the stereotypes associated with them 
have changed over time but the meaning is always the same-dependency is an 
individual failing and a moral hazard of welfare. Id. at 82-85. The modern his-
tory of American welfare reflects political struggle about the categorization of 
particular groups. Id. Since the New Deal elderly workers have come to be per-
ceived as deserving, while white widows were deserving of carefully adminis-
tered aid and distinguished from both immigrant poor and persons of color who 
received little aid. Id. at 105. Since the 1960s, another shift in perceptions has 
associated welfare dependency with young unmarried African American moth-
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welfare state has remained essentially unchanged: discipli-
nary welfare for the poor and welfare capitalism for the rest. 11 
B. Leaving Welfare, Even Poorer 
The purported evidence of welfare reform's "success" is 
the 53% decline in welfare caseloads between 1996 and June 
2000. 12 Underlying the claim is an assumption that reform 
has enabled welfare "leavers" to enter employment and, 
within a short period, achieve self sufficiency. 13 These as-
sumptions about the reasons for leaving welfare and the 
benefits of employment among former recipients are mis-
taken. At the height of labor market growth, in the late 
1990s and before the recession, more than 17% of the full 
time prime age labor force in the United States earned less 
than the poverty level. 14 For women, the percentage was 
ers and a shiftless population of African American males who father their chil-
dren. Id at 114. 
11. See generally KLEIN, supra note 9. 
12. See Sanford Schram & Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy 
Discourse, and the Politics of Research, in PRAXIS FOR THE POOR: PIVEN AND 
CLOWARD AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SOCIAL WELFARE 195 (San-
ford Schram ed., 2002). 
13. Reformers have sometimes said that employment will lift these leavers 
out of poverty, but ending poverty was not among the legislative purposes in-
cluded in TANF, the 1996 welfare reform legislation. See Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2004); see 
also Ron Haskins, Effects of Weltare Reform on Family Income and Poverty, in 
THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 119-20 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 
2001). 
14. Year round attachment to the labor force means that an individual is 
working or looking for work fifty weeks a year. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., 
THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2001-2002, at 322 (2001). Based on the De-
partment of Labor's poverty measure, more than 34 million Americans live be-
low the poverty line, and over 14 million have incomes less than halfthe pov-
erty line. See ROBERT GREENSTEIN ET AL., CENTER FOR BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, POVERTY INCREASES AND MEDIAN INCOMES DECLINE FOR THE 
SECOND CONSECUTIVE YEAR (Sept. 23, 2003), at http://www.cbpp.org/9-26-
03pov-fact.htm. Tragically, the poor are getting poorer. The number deemed 
poor would vastly increase using the poverty standard accepted in many other 
economically developed societies. For a discussion of alternative measures of 
poverty and the general acceptance among European governments of a higher 
threshold, see Katherine McFate et al., Markets and States: Poverty Trends and 
Transfer System Effectiveness in the 1980s, in POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND THE 
FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY: WESTERN STATES IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 30 
(Katherine McFate et al. eds., 1995). Measured by the U.S. poverty standard, 
the poverty rate is rising and three million more Americans are poorer now 
than they were in 2000. Id The poverty gap is also rising-the gap between 
the average poor person's income and the official poverty line. Id 
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much higher-nearly one quarter of all women with full time 
labor force attachment did not earn enough to raise them 
above the poverty line. 15 For these Americans, work is inse-
cure, without affordable health care or other benefits, and re-
quires great flexibility in scheduling family commitments. 
This is the labor market that poor women leaving welfare 
have entered, and the labor market in which most will re-
• 16 main. 
In spite of low wages and lousy jobs, women always left 
welfare for work rather quickly. Under the prior welfare pro-
gram, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, more than 
50% of all recipients left within one year. 17 Thus, early depar-
tures from welfare have been the historical norm, not the ex-
ception. 
What explains recently declining welfare caseloads? Re-
search by economists has concluded that the strong economy 
and increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit have been the 
most important factors that explain any increase in work. It 
is possible that much of the decline has little to do with in-
creasing employment among poor women, and is likely due to 
aggressive diversion programs that discourage new applica-
tions for welfare. Further, there is evidence tha:t the admini-
stration of sanctions for violating bureaucratic regulations 
may account for up to 40% of welfare exits in some states. 18 
The latest studies by the Urban Institute show that only 42% 
of recent leavers are working (compared to 49% in 1999), and 
more than one quarter quickly returned to the T ANF pro-
gram. 19 
15. See MISHEL, supra note 14, at 322. 
16. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: 
Low-Income Mothers' Decisions About Work at Home in the Market, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1029 (2004). 
17. HANDLER & HAsENFELD, supra note 3, at 46. 
18. See Schram & Soss, supra note 12, at 197. 
19. See PAMELA LOPREST, URBAN INST., How ARE FAMILIES THAT LEFT 
WELFARE DOING? A COMPARISON OF EARLY AND RECENT WELFARE LEAVERS 
(2001) [hereinafter LOPREST, COMPARISON OF WELFARE LEAVERS), at 
http://www.urban.org/template.cfm?Template=ITaggedContent/ViewPublication 
.cfm&PublicationlD=7249&NavMenulD=95; see also PAMELA LOPREST, URBAN 
INST., FEWER WELFARE LEAVERS EMPLOYED IN A WEAK ECONOMY (2003), at 
http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=8550. About 4% were surviving on other 
government programs such as SSI, and 7.6% had a working family member who 
supported them. LOPREST, COMPARISON OF WELFARE LEAVERS, supra. More 
than 20% had no current source of income (although about one third of these 
had worked recently). Id 
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Most leavers who work are still very poor. In 1998-in a 
strong economy-leavers' earnings ranged from $665 to $1083 
per month, well below the poverty threshold for a family of 
three set at $1095 per month. 20 One third reported cutting 
meal sizes and skipping meals, and more than one third were 
unable to pay rent or utilities on a regular basis ( 46% in 
1999).21 How could such families afford health care, child 
care, transportation to work, and other costs associated with 
employment? How many have had to return to violent part-
ners?22 To help meet some of the costs, welfare reform pro-
vided funding for transitional Medicaid and child care. 23 Yet 
the Urban Institute reported that most leavers were not ac-
tually receiving Medicaid, child care assistance, or food 
stamps.24 
The critical point is that we know how to create a better 
welfare state without massive redistribution. TANF's "work 
first" emphasis was based loosely on early welfare-to-work 
experiments that pushed a few more women to leave welfare, 
but which also showed that improvements in well-being 
would be small at best and short lived. 25 Those experimental 
findings were not wrong. We also have findings from other 
experiments that succeeded in providing assistance to poor 
families in ways that TANF has failed. 26 
C. Flexibility and Choice: Lessons from the Other Welfare 
Experiments 
Experiments with alternative forms of welfare provision 
have demonstrated that family welfare can be improved, em-
ployability enhanced, and poverty reduced by taking a differ-
20. See Schram & Soss, supra note 12, at 197. 
21. Seeid 
22. The NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund estimates that 30% of 
current TANF recipients experience domestic violence and up to 60% have suf-
fered violence at some point. See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, 
WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION: DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2001), at 
http://www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/violence.shtml. 
23. See Child Care & Development Block Grant, 42 U.S.C. § 9858 (1990) as 
amended by Pub.L. 104-193 (1996), Title VI § 603(a). Transitional Medicaid 
benefits are mandated by TANF. See42 U.S.C. § 608(s)(ll)A (2004). 
24. Fifty-three percent of leavers were not receiving Medicaid, 81 % did not 
receive child care assistance, 85% did not receive help finding a job, and 69% did 
not even receive food stamps. See Schram & Soss, supra note 12, at 199. 
25. See HANDLER & HAsENFELD, supra note 10, at 67. 
26. See id at 216. 
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ent approach. Such experiments point to a key element of 
success: enabling poor women to manage their own lives so 
that they can choose and pursue a good or better quality life 
for themselves and their families. 
The first lesson from welfare experiments is that it is the 
labor market that has failed to provide jobs with living wages 
and benefits, or enough jobs of any description for which the 
poor, unemployed, and those currently discouraged from look-
ing for work are eligible. Leading scholars Joel Handler and 
Yeheskel Hasenfeld have concluded that the vast majority of 
welfare recipients have been ready, willing, and able to work, 
and that they would leave welfare if a job enabled them and 
their. families to survive. 21 Evaluation of welfare-to-work 
experiments conducted during the 1980s and 1990s revealed 
an alternative to the relatively cheap "work first" strategy 
that became the model for welfare reform. A few states 
provided access to a wide range of services, extending over 
long periods of time. Not surprising, these programs were 
more successful at moving recipients into better jobs and at 
moving some hard-to-employ recipients into work.28 Although 
these programs have contributed greatly to our 
understanding that poor women will voluntarily seek the 
services they need to help them become more self-sufficient 
and to become employable, the programs are more costly. 
After reviewing prior welfare-to-work experiments, Handler 
and Hasenfeld conclude that "the most fundamental reason 
why welfare-to-work programs fail is that they are seldom 
truly intended to respond to the needs of welfare recipients."29 
More recent experiments, some supported by private 
funding, show that the right kind of assistance can make a 
sustainable difference. For example, the New Hope experi-
ment offered 1300 randomly selected poor families in Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin a flexible package of benefits that in-
cluded a wage supplement, Medicaid, center-based and after-
school child care, and intensive counseling and support. 30 
27. See id. at 82-132. 
28. See id. at 7 4. 
29. Id at 91. 
30. See ALETHA C. HUSTON ET AL., MANPOWER DEV. RES. CORP., NEW HOPE 
FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN: FIVE-YEAR RESULTS OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE 
POVERTY AND REFORM WELFARE, at www.mdrc.org (2003) (last visited Sept. 30, 
2003). 
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Participants were required to work a minimum of thirty 
hours a week, and employment was guaranteed by the pro-
ject, 31 which supplied community service jobs when no other 
work was available. One of the project's critical limitations 
was the mandatory link between benefits and work commit-
ment, but for working participants the benefits were flexible 
and relatively generous. The project lifted many families out 
of poverty, and encouraged more work at higher wages. 32 The 
most striking finding was that the children benefited educa-
tionally and socially from stable, quality day care and a more 
stable home environment. 33 Important qualities distinguish 
this experiment from TANF, including respect for choices 
made by the families concerning work, child care, and the 
package of supporting services. The program itself empha-
sized flexibility, stability, empathetic counseling, and ending 
poverty. New Hope findings have been confirmed by in-depth 
research by other scholars who underscore the importance of 
flexible employment as well as stable, parent-chosen quality 
day care.34 
The New Hope experiment is not the future, but it points 
the way. Follow-up analysis by the Joint Center for Poverty 
Research suggested that the results of New Hope could be 
vastly improved by providing specialized services for the 
women who were unable to take advantage of New Hope's 
benefits. Some women lacked proper information. Others 
needed services related to mental health problems, substance 
abuse, or domestic violence and other sources of family insta-
bility. 35 Most importantly, evaluators suggested that flexibil-
ity was a key to success.36 They recommended, for example, 
improving outcomes by separating the benefits offered by fu-
ture programs from work requirements, to support parents' 




34. See Julia Henly & Susan Lambert, Linking Workplace Practices to 
Child Care Requirements: Lower-Level Workers in Lower-Skilled Jobs, in 
WORKFORCE/WORKPLACE MISMATCH? WORK, FAMILY, HEALTH, & WELL-BEING 
(Suzanne Bianchi et al., eds., 2003), at 
http://www.popcenter.umd.edu/conferences/nichd/papers/henly.pdf. 
35. See Thomas S. Weisner et al., Understanding Working Poor Families in 
the New Hope Program, 6 Pov. RES. NEWS 3 (2002). 
36. Seeid 
1008 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW Vol: 44 
scheduling.37 Further, a follow-up evaluation after five years 
showed that the benefits of flexibility and choice have been 
sustained, particularly for the children of these families. 38 
The failure of 1996 welfare reform to end poverty and the 
relative success of experimental alternatives has clear impli-
cations. Poverty can be reduced by providing the following 
resources, available to many with incomes above the median, 
but unavailable to a large proportion of those who earn less, 
and almost universally absent among those who work and 
earn less than the poverty level: (1) decent work, including 
adequate income, stability, and flexibility to accommodate 
family and personal needs, (2) flexible day care accommodat-
ing parents' scheduling and values and which supports early 
learning and social development, (3) health insurance, (4) 
stable housing (not a part of the Milwaukee experiment but 
the participants mostly lived in housing with which they were 
satisfied), (5) empathetic counseling-strongly endorsed by 
the New Hope participants who received counseling on finan-
cial matters, family problems, personal health including men-
tal health problems, community resources, and which pro-
vided emotional support. 
There are few surprises here. The effects of more flexible 
and generous support for employment and care work are easy 
to see in New Hope's measures of parent success and espe-
cially child well-being. The annual per family cost of the New 
Hope experiment was a modest $5300.39 Although the cost of 
New Hope's services was relatively modest, these welfare ex-
periments show that adequate welfare will require a greater 
investment of resources. 
The critical question is how can the lessons from these 
experiments be applied in an era when new programs requir-
ing redistribution at the national level are very unlikely to be 
enacted? 
D. Redefining Welfare 
Welfare reform in the 1990s was captured by the sym-
bolic politics of dependency. If welfare were freed from its as-
sociation with false assumptions about the causes of poverty 
37. Seeid. 
38. See HUSTON ET AL., supra note 30. 
39. Some, but not all families also received benefits under Wisconsin's W2 
welfare reform program and federal benefits. See id. 
2004 BUILD/NGA LOCAL WELFARE STATE 1009 
and stereotypes of poor mothers, what should advocates seek 
in order to help poor families and lift them out of poverty? Of 
course, welfare cannot be separated from the symbolic politics 
of the welfare state, and that problem raises the question of 
political strategy that I will discuss in the last section.40 
Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has sug-
gested that extreme economic inequality is a social condition 
brought about by society's failure to create individual capabil-
ity.41 Inequality, in this view, arises from conditions that re-
strict development of an individual's capabilities. Conditions 
that limit material resources literally render one poor, but 
they are not the only, or perhaps even the most important, 
societal failure that undermines well-being and hope for im-
provement. Adequate education, health care, and social sup-
port are equally critical. A true definition of poverty, he ar-
gues, is the failure to develop capability to participate in 
society and to thrive. 42 Thus, as he has noted, materially poor 
Bengladeshi may thrive relative to some materially better off 
urban African American teens, who have a much shorter life 
expectancy. 43 
Sen's arguments are greatly illuminated by Professor 
Lynne Haney's study of welfare for poor women under succes-
sive political regimes in Hungary.44 The government of social-
ist Hungary intruded deeply into work, family, and all other 
areas of social life,45 creating opportunities for women to in-
voke the state to support their demands for flexibility and ac-
commodation in each institutional sphere, permitting them to 
choose how to thrive.46 Under the liberal regime instituted af-
ter the fall of socialist government, welfare was restricted, 
forcing women to make accommodations in the private sphere 
through family networks or the labor market. The net effects 
on women under the two regimes were dramatically different. 
Under the first regime, women gained capacity to maneuver 
effectively in order to increase their welfare. Under the last 
regime, women's freedom to maneuver was severely limited 
40. See infra Part IV. 
41. AMARYTA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 108-09 (1992). 
42. Seeid. 
43. Seeid. 
44. LYNNE HANEY, INVENTING THE NEEDY: GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF 
WELFARE IN HUNGARY 242-44 (2002). 
45. Seeid 
46. Id 
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by their lack of capacity. Consequently, families experienced 
far greater difficulties. She calls the quality that these insti-
tutions enhanced maneuverability. Maneuverability is pro-
moted, Haney argues, when governments hold major institu-
tions accountable for women's welfare rather than striving to 
fix or improve the woman.47 
Maneuverability is increased by the availability of flexi-
ble jobs, supportive work places, family resilience, housing 
options, continuing medical benefits, retirement security, and 
other essential components of individual autonomy. A core 
component of this goal is accommodation of flexible careers 
that include periods of care work and voluntary unemploy-
ment to pursue education or other forms of human capital 
growth without the destructive side-effects that characterize 
liberal welfare regimes-insecurity and even destitution. 
American welfare experiments confirm the superiority of 
voluntary and flexible programs of support over longer peri-
ods of time, enabling the poor to choose the combination of 
decent work, parenting, and education that will enable them 
to develop the capacities needed for a better life. As New 
Hope demonstrated, enabling individuals to take initiative 
and to make choices increases their productivity and family 
well-being, benefits that extend to subsequent generations. 
Development of capabilities relates to the provision of 
welfare in another important way, namely treating the poor 
as citizens rather than patients. The social relations theory 
of welfare rights advanced by Professor Martha Minow makes 
this point.48 In the early years of welfare administration, the 
task of addressing the need for social support for the poor fell 
to the Progressive Era social worker. The social 
worker/reformer combined professional knowledge with em-
pathy and direct knowledge of the poor. Minow argues that 
the social worker's ability to help came from the clients them-
selves-from knowledge that they alone possessed and pro-
vided to the professionals who helped them.49 That knowl-
edge included the precise nature of their needs and of the 
capacities that could be enhanced to enable them to partici-
pate fully in the life of the community. Of course, bringing 
47. Id. 
48. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 110-14 (1990). 
49. See id. at 245-47. 
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the poor into decision making about how to provide welfare 
has far reaching implications. Respecting their knowledge 
requires establishing their political voice and their political 
citizenship. In sum, the social relations theory says that so-
cial citizenship for the poor and other socially marginal 
groups will follow from political inclusion. 
As knowledge of the causes and effects of poverty deep-
ens, poverty advocates acknowledge that there is a need for 
developmental welfare to assist individuals to participate 
more effectively in decisions affecting them-therapeutic as-
sistance that increases capabilities of individuals inured to 
lives constrained by institutional failure. 50 Many individuals 
need and seek help in leading more productive lives.51 
The contradiction between autonomy and need lies at the 
heart of all welfare state programs. Full social citizenship 
presumes symbolic, but not actual, self-sufficiency. All mem-
bers of society-especially those fully employed-require con-
siderable social support. This contradiction also besets the 
advocacy of community welfare advocates who embrace si-
multaneously two apparently opposed understandings of 
autonomy of the poor: freedom from paternalism based on 
class, gender, and race and intervention to help individuals 
overcome personal inability to bring about change. Creating 
a differently structured context is the key. Restructuring the 
context of poverty to alter the behavior of the poor sounds like 
the panopticon, the repressive prison created to discipline and 
morally reform deviants, described by Michel Foucault.52 
Autonomy should mean creating an inclusive community that 
provides the right kind of support in the right way to increase 
individual capacity. Distinguishing between repressive and 
therapeutic interventions will ultimately depend, as Minow 
argues, on democratic accountability of welfare programs to 
those who benefit from them.53 
50. See Joel F. Handler, Quiescence: The Scylla and Charibdis of Empow-
erment, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, 
LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 271 (Frank Munger 
ed., 2002) [hereinafter LABORING BELOW THE LINE]. 
51. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF 
THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996); Lucie White, Care at Work, in LABORING BELOW 
THE LINE, supra note 50, at 213. 
52. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
53. See MINOW, supra note 48, at 114. 
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Ill. COMMUNITY-BASED ACTIVISM 
Activists, organizers, and scholars who have become ad-
vocates for those who are increasingly vulnerable in the new 
economy have focused on community-based alternatives to 
federal welfare programs. They have devoted increasing at-
tention and energy to local coalition building and political ac-
tivism resources to build a local welfare state. The strategy is 
vitally important, and builds on roots stretching back to the 
New Deal, the Progressive Era, and even earlier to working 
class cooperative movements.54 Yet there have been trench-
ant critiques of this movement when it comes to serving the 
poorest community members, and even some of its ardent 
proponents acknowledge the difficult challenges faced by ef-
forts to rebuild a stronger welfare state at the local level.55 
Community-based projects to enhance the welfare state's 
safety net for the poor have taken three overlapping forms: 
(1) organizing to exploit the market power of the poor, (2) ex-
tending the state's resources through privatization, and (3) 
creating a local, more egalitarian welfare state. 
A. Utilizing Underdeveloped Market Power 
First, some community-based projects exploit the market 
power of poor communities to provide what the public safety 
net and the job markets do not offer to individuals-better 
wages, needed benefits, and greater security. Examples in-
clude many successful traditional community economic devel-
opment corporations and worker cooperatives.56 The projects 
extend a long tradition of organizing on behalf of those at the 
economic margins, but as William Simon observes in his ex-
amination of the community economic development move-
ment, grassroots organizing has flourished for the past 
twenty-five years since conservatives targeted further growth 
in the welfare state and began to dismantle existing pro-
54. See KLEIN, supra note 9, at 116. See generally William Forbath, Cons ti· 
tutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique, and Reconstruction, 69 FORD. L. 
REV. 1821 (2001); MINOW, supra note 48, at 247-57. 
55. See WILLIAM SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2002). 
56. See generally Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job 
Creation Strategy for Low-Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 
181 (1999) [hereinafter Cummings, Developing Cooperatives]. 
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grams. 67 While successful projects often organize the better-
off and most employable working poor, a growing number of 
worker cooperatives and mutual assistance projects have 
been attempted on behalf of the very poor and former welfare 
recip~.ents. 58 Some cooperatives organized among the poorest 
members of communities have been successful, but they often 
struggle for stability.69 
Among the most successful examples of self-help organiz-
ing among marginal and vulnerable members of a community 
is Make the Road by Walking, an organization of immigrant 
day-laborers on Long Island, New York.60 The organization's 
Workplace Project strove to establish fair treatment of day 
workers, one aspect of the organization's broader mission of 
meeting the needs of low-wage and often undocumented 
workers who are exploited by local businesses and homeown-
ers. 61 By leveraging the growing need for low-wage labor in 
Long Island's affluent communities, the Workplace Project 
was able to gain community support for the workers' goals 
and to obtain passage of state legislation that protected the 
workers' right to wages. 62 
A second successful example is a standout among the 
57. SIMON, supra note 55, at 17-40. See generally PAUL OSTERMAN, 
SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: How IT HAS CHANGED 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1999). 
58. For example, Working Partnerships, USA has created an ambitious pro-
ject to provide job and benefit continuity for both low-wage and highly paid 
temporary workers in California's Silicon Valley. Established as a ''high-road 
temporary staffing firm," the Working Partnerships Membership Association 
guarantees access to health benefits, provides training, and operates well-
supported job placement services. Established by the South Bay Labor Council, 
Working Partnerships draws on the resources of its members, but also benefits 
from additional support from labor unions and large foundations, such as Ford, 
Hewlett, and the Campaign for Human Development. See WORKING 
PARTNERSHIP MEMBERSHIP Ass'N, WHO WE ARE, at 
http://www.wpmembers.org/who/index/php (last visited Sept. 9, 2003); see also 
the advocacy group list provided by the Linc Project, at 
http://www.lincproject.org/ (last visited June 9, 2004). 
59. Steven Greenhouse, Heath Aides U'ho Get Sick Days?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
14, 2004, at Bl; see also Cooperative Home Care Associates, at 
http://www.winwinpartner.com/SmMedSizedBusinesses/smCooperativeAssoc.ht 
ml (last visited May 31, 2004). 
60. See http://www.maketheroad.org/ (last visited May 31, 2004). 
61. Seeid. 
62. See Jennifer Gordon, Symposium, Economic Justice in America's Cities: 
Visions and Revisions of a Moment: We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant 
Workers, The Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995). 
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growing number of health care worker cooperatives employ-
ing many former welfare recipients.63 Cooperative Home 
Health Care Associates in Bronx, New York is owned by its 
780 employees and provides wages and benefits that exceed 
those of similar companies, including a guaranteed work 
week and educational benefits. 64 Employees own shares in 
the company and elect eight of its twelve board members. 
These factors contribute to their willingness to forego salary 
and benefit increases for substantial periods of time to insure 
the cooperative's fiscal soundness. 
B. Privatization of Welfare 
A second strategy for extending welfare at the local level 
has been to encourage public/private partnerships. Privatiza-
tion has become one of the pillars of new conservatism,65 and 
the Bush administration has aggressively promoted private 
participation in public welfare. 66 Proposals for managed 
medical care to replace Medicaid entitlements, private social 
security accounts to replace entitlement to fixed retirement 
benefits, contracted-out welfare services and administration 
to replace the work formerly done by government employees 
promise to harness the power of the private market to meet 
needs while keeping costs at an efficient level. Of course, 
such proposals mean that the intended beneficiaries will bear 
the risk of an underperforming market due to market de-
clines, unresponsiveness to consumer preferences, or outright 
corruption-all the factors that have always disadvantaged 
poor consumers in particular. 
Welfare reform has stimulated expansion of an already 
vibrant grassroots and nonprofit scene as existing providers 
have responded to opportunities to expand their role. In ad-
63. Home health care aide is among the few low-wage occupations for which 
there has been a steady or growing demand in many parts of the country. U.S. 
DEP'T OF LAB., EMP. & TRAINING ADMIN., HEALTH CARE: INDUSTRY SNAPSHOT-
GROWTH PATTERN, at http://www.doleta.gov/BRG/lndProf/HealthProfile.cdm 
(last visited June 10, 2004). 
64. See Cooperative Home Care Associates, supra note 59. 
65. MICHAEL KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSIDP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN 
WELFARE STATE 28-29 (2001). 
66. See Press Release, President Emphasizes Need for Welfare Reform (July 
2, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020702-2.html; 
see also President's Compassion Agenda, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/compassionate/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
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dition, a host of first-timers-new for-profit corporations, con-
verted government contractors, as well as newly-minted not-
for-profits-have rushed to respond. Many now benefit from 
large contracts with local welfare administrators anxious to 
expand their capacity to manage the demands of welfare-to-
work.67 
Many advocates for the poor view the privatization of 
welfare with skepticism. 68 Some of the skepticism grows from 
the fact that services previously provided by public employees 
are being contracted out to private organizations with little 
provision for accountability.69 Unlike public administrators to 
whom public accountability laws apply, the commitment of a 
private provider to the public goals of welfare is limited to its 
contract performance and, in many cases, will quite legiti-
mately be influenced by external market pressures. Particu-
larly sharp criticism has been directed at the Bush admini-
stration's promotion of "charitable choice," which emphasizes 
giving an important role to faith-based providers.70 To oppo-
nents, trusting faith-based providers to extend the state's ca-
pacity to provide a safety net seems to risk undermining con-
stitutional protection for a woman's right to choose, which 
some faith-based organizations oppose, and discrimination 
against service recipients who do not conform to the life-style 
67. See BILL BERKOWITZ, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, PROSPECTING 
AMONG THE POOR: WELFARE PRIVATIZATION (2001), at 
http://www.arc.org/welfare/prospecting.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
68. The outcry is ironic in one sense because the American welfare state al-
ways had a large private component in the form of state-encouraged employer 
pension and health care, as well as employer financed workers compensation 
and unemployment compensation. Contemporary emphasis on devolution has 
further privatized core public welfare functions such as welfare-to-work pro-
grams and, in some states, even public assistance administration. Public wel-
fare administration has always extended the reach of state programs by incor-
porating the motivation and resources of charitable organizations into public 
institutions. Charitable organizations have long been encouraged to supple-
ment the strictly public parts of our welfare state through large amounts of gov-
ernmental funding. See KATZ, supra note 65, at 137. 
69. See generally Diller, supra note 8. 
70. Charitable choice is embodied in the Bush administration's endorsement 
of faith based and community initiatives. See 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/index.html. Some mainstream 
news reports have been skeptical. See God and Government, NOW WITH BILL 
MOYERS, Sept. 26, 2003, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/churchandstate2.html; see also Ori Nir, Groups 
Seek to Monitor Faith-Based Initiatives, FORWARD, Jan. 30, 2004, available at 
http://www.forward.com/issues/2004/04. 0 l.30/news2.html. 
1016 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW Vol: 44 
or religious preferences of a faith-based provider.71 
While some for-profits obtain contracts to perform out-
sourced welfare and poverty relief functions, a new field for 
socially conscious and politically active not-for-profits has 
opened to address the accountability concerns created by 
transfer of direct program administration to private organiza-
tions. In this climate, grassroots organizing by and on behalf 
of poor women has been vigorous. 72 For example, Community 
Voices Heard is a particularly successful advocacy group in 
New York City. Organized by former welfare recipients, 
Community Voices Heard has devoted itself to increasing the 
power of poor women by raising members' consciousness and 
engaging in public actions to change the image of welfare re-
cipients. In 2000, CVH, together with a community-based ac-
tion organization, ACORN, led a successful effort to organize 
Work Experience Program participants who pressured the 
New York City Council to enact a WEP worker protection 
law.73 
C. Deepening Democracy at the Local Level 
A third form of community-based welfare state enhance-
ment targets local governance through the economic and po-
litical power of progressive coalitions. The "deepening democ-
racy" strategy described by Professors Archon Fung and Erik 
0. Wright envisions broad coalitions of traditional opponents 
or competitors within a semi-autonomous institutional set-
ting-a sector of the economy, a local government, or a school 
system. 74 The rationale for such coalition formation is to in-
71. See generally Daniel K. Storino, Note, Resurrecting the Faith-Based 
Plan: Analyzing Government Funding for Religious Social Service Groups, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 389 (2003); see also, e.g., Andrea Boyle, The Faith-Based 
Legal Landscape (June 2003), available at 
http://journalism.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/02-1315faith.html. 
72. A few of the many coalitions of grassroots organizations fighting poverty 
include Grassroots Organizing for Welfare Leadership, at 
http://www.ctwo.org/growl/record.html; Grassroots Organizing in Sisterhood, at 
http://www.groots.org/; and the Low Income Networking and Communications 
Project of the National Welfare Law Center, at 
http://www.lincproject.org/default.asp. 
73. See Thomas J. Lueck, Council Overrides Guiliani on 3 Bills, but He 
Vows Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at Bll. 
74. ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: 
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GoVERNANCE 20-
22 (2003). 
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elude enough traditionally competing actors so that when 
agreement is reached, the agreement itself is an effective in-
strument of governance. An effective agreement would reor-
ganize relationships among the participants to achieve gains 
in efficiency, productivity, and communal support. In other 
words, welfare. AB such, each successful coalition replaces ex-
isting competitive relations with more mutually beneficial co-
operative relations-thereby becoming a component of a reor-
ganized welfare state. 75 
Economist Annetta Bernhardt76 provides an example of a 
sectoral coalition, the Wisconsin Regional Training Partner-
ship ("WRTP"), that restructured the employment relation-
ship for many low-wage and welfare-to-work employees. The 
WRTP created mutually cooperative arrangements among 
business competitors. The business competitors benefited 
from a reliable supply of skilled workers at a cost born 
equally among competitors for their services. One goal of 
such coalitions, according to advocates, is creation of a more 
inclusive democratic base, or "deepened democracy," for po-
litical, economic, or administrative decision making. This 
new democratic base would include some previously excluded, 
relatively powerless members of the community who bene-
fited from a redistribution of public or private welfare. 77 Re-
distributed benefits included better jobs and fringe benefits, 
responsive municipal government, environmental amenities, 
or better education for their children. 
Yet, as Fung and Wright acknowledge, forming coalitions 
intended to extract private welfare from traditional adversar-
ies or to achieve other forms of redistribution by agreement 
will be particularly problematic for the poor. 78 Of all the pre-
75. Id at 24. 
76. See generally ANNE'ITE BERNHARDT ET AL., DIVERGENT PATHS: 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE NEW AMERICAN LABOR MARKET (2001). 
77. Fung and Wright discuss other local democracy experiments that have 
achieved at least partial success in a wide range of community settings and pol-
icy areas: decentralization in the Chicago school system, participatory budget-
ing in Porto Alegre, Brazil, village governance in India, and production of Habi-
tat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species Act. See generally FUNG 
& WRIGHT, supra note 74. See also Dorf & Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and 
Emergent Expen'mentalist Government, 53 V AND. L. REV. 831 (2000). 
78. FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 282-85; see also JOEL F. HANDLER, 
DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY 133 (1996). For another critique suggesting that the 
inherent inequalities among members of the coalition are likely to create seri-
ous problems of long term stability, see Jennifer Gordon, New Governance Mod-
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conditions for success, Fung and Wright suggest that delib-
erative decision making and commitment will be the most 
problematic. 79 Power imbalances will be nearly unavoidable 
among participants who attempt to reorganize their relations 
with one another in order to achieve, in part, greater welfare 
for the poor.80 Unless an imbalance of power can be checked 
by opportunistic alliances, conditional rewards for delibera-
tion by a higher level of authority, or threats by such low-
wage worker or consumer friendly groups as unions or local 
advocacy organizations, truly deliberative decision making 
may not develop.81 While these examples show that the local 
welfare state may be reformed to achieve progressive welfare 
state goals, these experiments will not be easy to replicate. 
Their reliance on unique circumstances, exceptional political 
coalitions, or high levels of social capital suggests that 
broader transformation will be difficult to achieve. 
Further, factors that limit replication of successful coali-
tions among members of the middle and working classes, 
such as inadequate resources, leadership, and collective ac-
tion problems, are even more problematic for the working 
poor and dependent poor who seek a stronger welfare state. 
Central to the evaluation of successful welfare-to-work ex-
periments discussed earlier is the principle that higher initial 
costs may be associated with successful programs that enable 
the poor to sustain work, support a family, and fully partici-
pate as a citizen, including participation in political activism. 
As the national economy has weakened, programs like New 
Hope, which provide intensive support, have been cut back or 
ended. Without additional federal financial support and fed-
eral benchmark standards that reflect what has been learned 
from successful programs, costly but effective programs will 
be severely limited. Moreover, a politically weak minority 
such as the poor, who have overlapping political disadvan-
tages of poverty and race, is unlikely to achieve changes in 
policies at the state or local level on its own. Further, recent 
els, New Roles of Rights: Lessons from the Underground Economy, N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming 2004). Similarly, Simon's penetrating appraisal 
of the Community Economic Development movement also concludes that the 
instability of low income communities poses a substantial threat to sustained, 
effective representation of their interests. See SIMON, supra note 55. 
79. FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 3-25. 
80. Id 
81. Id 
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governmental reforms that delegate new responsibilities to 
frontline workers to help welfare recipients with work and 
time limits only exacerbate the problems of "street-level" bu-
reaucracy unless there is a change in the political power bal-
ance at the local level.82 
A model for co-opting the local welfare state that is more 
responsive to the problems of powerless groups has been ad-
vanced by Scott Cummings. 83 Cummings argues that the poor 
must form broad political coalitions comprised of natural al-
lies committed to economic justice before engaging in peak 
bargaining with adversaries. Natural allies include grass-
roots organization, religious groups, and unions whose goals 
are closely related to the economic justice needs of the poor. 
Examples of successful collective action by such coalitions to 
achieve gains for poor communities include living wage cam-
paigns,84 low-wage labor cooperatives,85 and, importantly, 
utilization of publicly subsidized local development.86 Cum-
mings also cites examples of sectoral economic development 
similar to WRTP, but with an important difference from Fung 
and Wright's proposal, namely successful community-based 
organizing .that preceded negotiation and enabled representa-
tives of poor communities to bring considerable pressure to 
bear on reluctant resource holders subject to public man-
dates.87 
Cummings' "new model" community economic develop-
ment offers substantial advantages for the poor over the tra-
ditional model. The new model CED includes the poor, but it 
does so by recognizing that their inclusion is necessarily a po-
litical act. The poor will be served through redistribution re-
quiring a shift in power. Second, Cummings argues that the 
new model CED will resist market trends.88 It would main-
82. See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1983) 
(documenting effective control of the implementation of policies by frontline 
workers); see also HANDLER, supra note 78, at 133-68 (describing rare instances 
of empowerment of dependent persons who must rely on politicians, employers, 
or administrators for access to benefits). 
83. Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive 
Politics: Toward Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
399 (2001) [hereinafter Cummings, Progressive Politics]. . 
84. Id. at 466-67. 
85. Id. at 4 72; see also Cummings, Developing Cooperatives, supra note 56. 
86. See Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 480-83. 
87. Id at 487-91. 
88. Id 
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tain inclusion of the poor even when the market would create 
insurmountable barriers to their participation in the labor 
market or entrepreneurship. 
Two important aspects of all three strategies-market 
power, privatization, and deepening democracy-create par-
ticular challenges for advocates for the poorest community 
members. First, how should the goals of programs for the 
poorest be defined? Cummings has raised one of the most se-
rious concerns about some types of local economic develop-
ment advocacy, the tendency to adopt narrow market strate-
gies for small geographically defined poverty communities. 
Projects that depend solely upon resources available within 
an impoverished neighborhood ignore the fundamental struc-
tural barriers to economic equality and inevitably fail to help 
the poorest. In addition to their poverty, many members of 
these communities experience more barriers both to employ-
ment and to participation in political action. Barriers include 
lack of education, health problems, family instability, and 
domestic violence. Dependence upon social networks that are 
not easily adapted to employment at will is customary in the 
low-wage labor market, assuming a larger, more participatory 
community role. 
Second, local state projects typically require an initial in-
vestment of resources necessary for bargaining with coalition 
partners, providers, or public authorities. While there are 
examples of successful empowerment strategies for the poor 
that have required little initial financial resource investment, 
they have depended upon unique conditions creating interde-
pendence of powerful and powerless partners or the presence 
of more powerful allies (e.g., unions on behalf of workers, pro-
gressive advocacy organizations on behalf of low-wage work-
ers or care workers). 89 Common sense seems to suggest that 
the poorest will be at a severe disadvantage in negotiations 
for improved welfare institutions. 
In sum, advocates for local state strategies for enhancing 
the welfare of the poor must focus on increasing the capacity 
of members of the poorest communities for political action as 
well as self-help. Further, community advocates seeking po-
litical strategies must find means for asset creation or con-
version by turning physical, cultural, and social capital of the 
89. HANDLER, supra note 78. 
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inner city and other poor communities into working capital.90 
IV. INTERROGATING LOCAL WELFARE STRATEGIES 
Strengthening the capacity of local institutions for inclu-
sion and for welfare can help poor men and women increase 
their "maneuverability" by redirecting resources to training, 
jobs, day care, housing, education, and services that increase 
their capability to meet their own needs and their responsi-
bilities for care work. These needs are not met by the present 
labor market or by the downsized national welfare state. The 
small but growing number of community-based projects that 
have successfully addressed some of the welfare needs of the 
poorest individuals may hold tentative lessons for the next 
generation of activists and organizers attempting to grow the 
local welfare state. 
A. Lesson One: The Nature of Advocacy Is Important. 
Scott Cummings argues that basing community economic 
development on the market potential in a particular 
neighborhood limits effectiveness. This is true because lever-
age is restricted to a particular market; and because poor 
communities acting alone rarely have the political clout to 
play what has been called the "inside game" of urban politics. 
As part of the "inside game," major resources and opportuni-
ties are allocated among the dominant power holders. The 
economic disadvantage of marginal and minority members of 
a community is a political problem, not an economic problem. 
Therefore, the response to economic disadvantage experi-
enced in poor neighborhoods must be to coordinate political 
reform that emphasizes structural change rather than meet-
ing the needs of specific urban neighborhoods. 91 Cummings 
proposes a new model for community development advocacy 
for the poor and other marginal groups that differs from tra-
ditional market oriented community development in three 
90. Some scholars in writing about the culture of poverty and the under-
class have contributed to the perception that the poor have few assets or capa-
bilities that might make them successful coalition partners in the politics of a 
more progressive local welfare state. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 51. Thus, in 
addition to countering the "myth and ceremony" of moral politics on the right, 
advocates for the poor must also reexamine the perceptions of poor communities 
held by "experts" on poverty. 
91. Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 447. 
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ways: (1) the goal is broadly based economic justice, (2) advo-
cates seek coalition with other community-based actors such 
as clergy and unions, and (3) the movement need not be spa-
tially bounded but rather seeks sectoral, regional, national, or 
even transnational coalitions.92 
Cummings identifies examples of successful coalitions, 
including living wage campaigns such as the alliance of Bos-
ton grassroots advocates led by ACORN, the AFL-CIO, and 
Greater Boston Legal Services,93 and community development 
coalitions such as the Figeroa Corridor Coalition for Economic 
Justice in Los Angeles, a group of community organizations, 
unions, and residents that won a "community benefits plan" 
that included parks, local hiring, and an affordable housing 
set-aside from developers of a billion-dollar sports and enter-
tainment complex. 94 
But critics have rightly questioned the sustainability of 
such coalitions. The poorest members of communities typi-
cally lack resources to initiate or sustain political action and 
many may lack even the capacity to participate effectively as 
members. Fortunately, effective collective action is not de-
termined by initial levels of income or social capital alone. 
The Workplace Project95 illustrates the power of poor, depend-
ent, and undocumented laborers aided by an inspired organ-
izer. This organizer tapped the workers' own potential and 
drew in unlikely allies on the basis of their economic self-
interest. But at least initially, welfare recipients seldom have 
the right kind of social capital for such a movement-indeed, 
they are dependent upon welfare not only because they are 
economically poor, but also because they lack social capital 
that many other poor families can rely upon. 96 Plenty of 
grass-roots poverty organizations exist, but they provide mu-
tual aid rather than market power, and many of those depend 
on external funding and organization. Again, Make the Road 
by Walking provides a rare example of a grassroots move-
ment that was successful at the "outside game"-i.e. in a re-
92. Id at 458-64. 
93. Id at 470. 
94. Id. at 480. 
95. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
96. Julia R. Henly, Informal Support Networks and the Maintenance of 
Low- Wage Jobs, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE, supra note 50, at 179; see also 
WILSON, supra note 51. 
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gional labor market. 
These criticisms lead to a second lesson. 
B. Lesson Two: Assets Are Needed to Build Alliances and to 
Bargain with Opponents. 
Advocates can help develop at least three types of assets 
needed to fulfill the promise of community-based organizing 
for increased public and private welfare in poor communities: 
cultural, labor, and economic assets. 
First, the cultural assets of poor neighborhoods often in-
clude strong religious institutions,97 effective networks sup-
porting family survival,98 an ethic of care in single-parent and 
extended families,99 and values supporting work and mobil-
ity.Ioo Many poverty scholars have been quick to dismiss the 
experience of individuals in urban neighborhoods as part of 
the problem of poverty and recommend changing such cul-
tures by transforming neighborhood institutions and altering 
the opportunity structure. IOI Yet, such neighborhoods not 
only shape and sustain values that should be respected and 
fostered, but they provide considerable social capital that 
may, with leadership and experience, be turned to organizing 
and activism. The lessons learned from grassroots activism 
have often centered on the importance of developing leader-
ship, and in turn drawing out the potential of the consider-
able social capital that resides in poor communities. I02 
It is no surprise that many organizations founded by 
former welfare recipients and poor persons place conscious-
ness raising and leadership development high on their 
97. See HAROLD MACDOUGALL, BLACK BALTIMORE: A NEW THEORY OF 
COMMUNITY (1993); Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Church Culture as a Strategy of Ac-
tion in a Black Community, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 767 (1998). 
98. See CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A 
BLACK COMMUNITY (1974); COPING WITH POVERTY: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF 
NEIGHBORHOOD, WORK AND FAMILY IN THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
(Sheldon Danzinger & Ann Chih Lin eds., 2000). 
99. See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, 
RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001); STACK, supra note 98. 
100. See KATHERINE s. NEWMAN, No SHAME IN MY GAME, THE WORKING 
POOR IN THE INNER CITY 186 (1999). 
101. See generally WILSON, supra note 51. 
102. See SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS 64 (1989); HARRY BOYTE, 
BACKYARD REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE NEW CITIZEN MOVEMENT 44 
(1980). 
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agenda. 103 Their emphasis not only presumes that the poor 
have cultural resources that are valuable and can be mobi-
lized to support activism. The organizations also often as-
sume that the poor should lead their own movements. Fur-
ther, they assume that participation and leadership must be 
learned, and that opportunities to learn will be particularly 
valuable for persons who have been marginalized and ex-
cluded.104 This learning process is especially important for 
leaders of poor communities who must contend with better 
resourced and more experienced allies as well as opponents in 
building the kind of coalitions described by Cummings. 
Second, even the poorest communities have considerable 
labor assets. Worker cooperatives have been among the most 
successful enterprises among the poor and underemployed 
workers in poverty communities. 105 While worker co-ops ulti-
mately aim to provide goods or services for the market, poor 
mothers, as market workers or care workers, often require 
supporting services themselves. Services critical to successful 
employment and care work may take the form of training, 
flexible child care, and, as New Hope demonstrated, counsel-
ing. For members of poor communities, individual assistance 
and support, institutional change and community advocacy, 
go hand in hand. Such services can be provided through mu-
tual support organizations created and staffed by community 
members, and are elements of the model observable in exam-
ples discussed earlier such as Community Voices Heard and 
The Workplace Project, organizations staffed by members of 
the community served. 106 
The special requirements of the working poor create spe-
cial resource problems for worker cooperatives that serve 
them because of the costs of maintaining services needed to 
facilitate and support working single parents, workers requir-
ing additional training, or workers who have special medical 
103. For example, Welfare Rights Initiative, Community Voices Heard, Na-
tional Congress of Neighborhood Women, and Grassroots Organizations Operat-
ing Together in Sisterhood all stress the importance of leadership development 
and consciousness-raising. 
104. Such assumptions are supported by Lucie White's research on personal 
transformations that have occurred within Headstart. See White, supra note 
51. 
105. See Cummings, Developing Cooperatives, supra note 56; see also supra 
note 82 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra Part 111.A-B. 
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needs. Access to professional services is still more problem-
atic because of its expense. Thus, development of the labor 
assets of individuals in the poorest communities may require 
strategies that make use of the devolution of welfare pro-
grams and funding for public/private partnerships with not-
for-profits which are based in poor needy communities. 
The dependence of cultural asset and labor asset devel-
opment on external financial resources underscores a third 
kind of asset formation, physical and financial resource de-
velopment. Poor inner city communities have employed 
community economic development corporations for develop-
ment housing and businesses. 101 Likewise, development of 
community-based financial institutions is perceived as having 
particular value as an economic and political empowerment 
strategy. 108 
The federal government can help provide resources for 
poor communities, of course. The government's role need not 
involve massive redistribution, but rather setting bench-
marks for the use of resources and entitlements provided to 
businesses and employers, banks, and local governments. 
And this leads to a third lesson. 
C. Lesson Three: Rights May Still Be the Key. 
The Workplace Project's successful advocacy for a tough 
minimum wage law covering illegal immigrant day laborers 
in New York109 suggests that new rights yielded two impor-
tant resources. First, the law set an enforceable standard for 
employment negotiations between immigrant workers and 
employers. Equally important, new rights helped to build the 
capacity of the immigrants for further action by strengthen-
ing their self-perceptions and expectations of inclusion within 
the community. Both effects were critical to the future of the 
Project and its advocacy. 
The present ideological climate favors experimentation 
with local replacement of national welfare policies, especially 
107. See Michael H. Schill, Assessing the Role of Community Development 
Corporations in Inner City Economic Development, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 173 (1997). 
108. Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Em· 
powerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substan-
tive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1994). 
109. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
1026 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW Vol: 44 
when driven by the initiative of private actors. The key 
structural characteristic of the setting in which the experi-
ment can succeed in redistributing resources for welfare is 
devolution-together the actors must be able to exercise real 
power. Fung and Wright note that an agreement among the 
parties will be effective and constitutive of their future rela-
tions only if backed by a higher authority, in most cases pub-
lic authority, a condition they term "coordinated decentraliza-
tion."110 The higher authority must agree to respect and 
enforce the decision reached through deliberation among local 
actors. It follows that agreements to enhance the local wel-
fare state cannot be voluntary, but they must be binding and 
enforceable-i.e. backed in some way by governmental au-
thority. 
Economic development often depends on a variety of pub-
lic subsidies, such as low cost land, low cost loans, tax breaks, 
and public grants. 111 Linkages in state or federal legislation 
can require expenditure of public funds in ways that benefit 
underserved, poor, and politically marginal communities. By 
their very nature, such linkages create a space for dealings 
between poor communities, developers, and local govern-
ments about exploitation, taking, or transformation of com-
munity resources. Such dealings are often initially not delib-
erative but confrontational in order to place satisfaction of the 
legislative requirement for linkage on the public agenda. 
Thus, to gain resources, a poor community must often mobi-
lize first and leverage its initial investment in consciousness 
raising, leadership training, and coalition building through 
political action. 
Coalitions of community-based advocates have been suc-
cessful in exerting pressure for inclusion of affordable hous-
ing, local hiring requirements, and other community welfare 
benefits. A particularly fruitful source of local leverage arises 
under the federal Housing and Urban Development Act that 
requires public housing authorities and other HUD recipients 
to provide training and employment to low and very low-
income persons. These requirements have been strengthened 
110. FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 7 4. 
111. Id at 483-87; see also, e.g., The Housing and Urban Development Act of 
1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1701(u) (2001). Cummings notes that there are many federal 
programs that similarly link community development funds to redistribution. 
See Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 484 n.415. 
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in recent years notwithstanding the shrinking safety net for 
welfare recipients and low-income workers.112 
Advocates for community welfare development and the 
local welfare state know that governments must still play an 
important role. While the energy and vision for contemporary 
activism is local, rights and redistribution are essential for 
the success of efforts to extend the local welfare state to ad-
dress poverty. We can now understand better why public re-
sources remain important in spite of the barriers to obtaining 
them. Successful coalition building and advocacy for redistri-
bution at the local level requires devolution of money ear-
marked for community building together with regulation to 
support wider, and ideally deliberative, participation in nego-
tiations for welfare enhancing development. Devolution can 
increase the likelihood that local governmental interventions 
will support development of decent work, maneuverability, 
and community risk sharing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Is there hope for poverty relief beyond welfare reform? 
John Gilliam's sensitive interviews with welfare recipi-
ents offer profound insights into the effects of welfare admini-
stration on identity and capacity for employment and care 
work. 113 He discovers in these interviews a counter discourse 
to welfare surveillance, a discourse of care and connection. 
He argues that the existence of the discourse is the first step 
toward building a new political community. 114 By a new po-
litical community he means a community at the national level 
encompassing all those who want the welfare state to expand 
rather than narrow their autonomy and to strengthen indige-
nous visions of well-being and security rather than the sym-
bolic needs of a national political community. 
We need a vision for community advocacy. Welfare 
rights ascended when the poor were viewed as citizens and 
declined as dependency was characterized as a disease and 
the needy poor were stigmatized as incapable of full social 
citizenship. 
One such conception is the risk sharing, community-
112. Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 83, at 483-85. 
113. GILLIOM, supra note 99. 
114. Id. at 134-36. 
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based vision embraced by progressives during the New Deal. 
This vision is alive today, and it is reflected in the continuing 
success of advocacy for rights enabling community participa-
tion in local development. Communitarian values underlie 
the EITC as well as devolution of policy making to local delib-
eration (including public participation requirements; ex-
panded use of nonprofit providers, and local priority setting 
for welfare). 
Further, governmental mandates can target the poor in 
ways that are consistent with the dominant market ideology: 
poor families displaced by development should receive com-
pensating benefits as a form of cost internalization; services 
and facilities provided for the poor should include flexible 
benefits to make ending poverty a sustainable goal-through 
adequate training, living wage employment, and supporting 
services; and work should pay. 
As Jennifer Gordon has reminded us, standard setting 
provides a framework for inclusion and for deliberation about 
community level welfare state policymaking. Rights can 
strengthen the capacity of marginalized groups for self-help 
by legitimating their sense of themselves as empowered citi-
zens. 
There are allies in this struggle. Many states have tried 
to use welfare reform to better their programs, and they have 
not left recipients cut from TANF wholly unsupported. The 
reality of welfare reform is that there has been a transfer of 
fiscal burdens but not control of its core political features 
such as employment. The net fiscal burden and false promise 
of local control makes local governments potential allies in re-
sisting welfare reform as presently structured. Of course, 
many community activists-including religious organizations 
and labor unions-remain engaged in welfare advocacy for 
the long run. 
Our inquiry brings us back to our starting point: the poor 
need a national movement for welfare rights and for redistri-
bution. There is new hope for such a movement. The promise 
of deploying the local welfare state on behalf of the poor offers 
guidance for politically feasible advocacy. Washington con-
sensus on devolution and privatization can be made to work 
for the poor by making available the right kind of resources 
and power to facilitate local governance that supports inclu-
sive community development. 
